No Good Options: The Extended Nuclear Deterrence Trilemma

Summary:
Extended nuclear deterrence has been a core feature of U.S. grand strategy throughout the nuclear age. However, shifting U.S. commitments, a changing balance of power, and potential new patrons of extended nuclear deterrence are raising the question of how extended nuclear deterrence operates in more general terms, beyond the U.S. case. We identify a trilemma that exists when states offer extended nuclear deterrence. States cannot simultaneously prioritize three policy goals: credible deterrence; a nuclear arsenal oriented toward crisis stability; and nonproliferation. The choice to prioritize any two of these goals requires deprioritizing the third. We show that the constraints of the trilemma drove U.S. policy choices during the Cold War and sheds light on the China-North Korea relationship and ongoing policy debates regarding potential “post-American” options for European extended nuclear deterrence. 

Bio:
Mark Bell is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. His research examines issues relating to nuclear weapons and proliferation, international relations theory, and US and British foreign policy. His first book, Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave was published in 2021 by Cornell University Press and won the International Studies Association Foreign Policy Analysis Section's best book award. Other work has been published in journals including International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Strategic Studies, and Texas National Security Review. His policy oriented work has been published by Foreign Affairs, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Quarterly. He holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a Masters in Public Policy from Harvard Kennedy School, and a B.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from St. Anne's College, Oxford University.