In December 2022, the Kishida cabinet updated three key strategic documents: the “National Security Strategy” (NSS); the “National Defense Strategy” (NDS); and the “Defense Buildup Plan” (DBP).4 This formal shift in Japan’s national security posture was a less comprehensive change than some analysts had sought. Moreover, it remains unclear whether and how Japan will finance its new initiatives, and whether bureaucratic opposition may constrain change.5 Simultaneously, some of the most dramatic alterations in Japan’s national security posture—the sorts that have engendered screaming headlines—reflect longstanding political and bureaucratic preferences as much as, and arguably more than, changes in the strategic environment.

The point is that whether one assesses strategic decision-making, operational choices, or organizational changes—and here we do all three—one cannot be distracted by formal government documents or by aspirational claims for alliance solidarity. As we will demonstrate, national security outputs evoke the process of sausage-making as well as strategic thinking.

Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, a longtime advocate of Japanese defense reform, invoked a different, but parallel, metaphor when he suggested that the elements of Japan’s recent shift in national security strategy can be compared to “a child [that] just listed all the things that came off the top of their head.”6 Koda’s colorful remark may be hyperbolic, and we will argue that many changes are poised to move Japanese defense in positive directions. But we shall also explain how his observation nevertheless touches on the shortcomings of Japan’s recent security reforms.

In short, we will show how Japan’s responses to changing international circumstances reflect longstanding political and bureaucratic desires as much as objectively framed requirements. By extension, we will show that other important requirements—measures that might greatly improve Japanese security at relatively modest cost—are either not on the agenda or have received only perfunctory attention when they are less congruent with dominant conservative political thinking or run counter to established bureaucratic interests. In each of the policy areas we will examine, a somewhat different mix of opportunism and obstacles applies. We start with change at the broadest strategic level, an inherently political domain, in which Kingdon's window for change has been thrown open to allow some of the most dramatic adjustments.