The MIT Security Studies Program held the annual Jack Ruina Nuclear Age Dinner on Thursday Nov. 19, 2015. The guest speaker this year was Ambassador Wendy Sherman, who spoke on “Negotiating Change: The Iran Nuclear Deal.”

Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on September 21, 2011, a position she had retained until October 2015.

Prior to this position, Under Secretary Sherman served as Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group, a global strategy firm, and a member of the Investment Committee of Albright Capital Management, an affiliated investment advisory firm focused on emerging markets.

Ambassador Sherman served as Counselor for the State Department from 1997 to 2001, as well as Special Advisor to President Clinton and Policy Coordinator on North Korea. From 1993 to 1996, under Secretary of State Warren Christopher, she was Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.

Ambassador Sherman served as Chair of the Board of Directors of Oxfam America. She also served on the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Policy Board, a group tasked with providing the Secretary of Defense with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy.
In 2008, Ambassador Sherman was appointed by Congressional Leadership to serve on the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism.

2015 Field Trip: Gettysburg

Report by Marsin Alshamary (graduate student), Kacie Miura (graduate student), Rachel Esplin Odell (graduate student)

From October 29-31, 2015, the MIT Security Studies Program traveled to Gettysburg, PA, for a tour of the Gettysburg National Military Park. Retired Colonel Kevin Dixon of the U.S. Army War College led the staff ride tour of the Gettysburg battlefield on October 30. The tour began with a presentation where COL Dixon situated the battle within its broader historical and strategic context and by describing the series of compromises that preceded the crisis of 1860 and the secession of 11 Southern states. He portrayed newly elected President Abraham Lincoln’s decision to reject the concept of secession and deem the Confederacy states in rebellion as a pivotal moment that shaped the strategies each side would pursue over the course of the ensuing war.

Dixon framed those strategies in terms of the Clausewitzian “DIME” formulation, which emphasizes the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic aspects of strategy in warfare. The North and South each applied pressure in all of these areas to diminish the resistance of the enemy, as defined by the following equation: $R \ (Resistance) = M \ (Means) \times W \ (Will)$. In particular, the Union pursued a strategy of attrition that emphasized eliminating the South’s *means* ($M$) to resist Federal control, while the Confederacy pursued a strategy of exhaustion that prioritized eroding the North’s *will* ($W$) to resist Confederate independence. At an operational level, Confederate General Robert E. Lee adopted a scheme of perimeter defense with offensive counterstrikes, and with the Gettysburg campaign, he aimed to annihilate the North’s will by dramatically seizing Harrisburg, a Northern capital, and defeating the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil.
Following the discussion, the group boarded a tour bus and rode to the first stop of the tour, close to where the initial hostilities of the battle erupted on July 1st, 1863. There Dixon provided an overview of the organization, communications, and technology that characterized 19th-century warfare. He emphasized the advances in rifling technology that had significantly improved the range and accuracy of small arms by the time of the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863. Then he proceeded to set the stage for the battle by describing the status and whereabouts of the key components and actors in the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac in the days leading up to July 1st. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had been moving north through the Shenandoah/Cumberland Valley, beyond the cover of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Lee had ordered General J.E.B. Stuart to take three of his seven brigades of cavalry north along the east flank of Lee’s army as a “moving flank screen” that would protect Lee’s troops and gather intelligence on the movements of the Army of the Potomac. Lee’s forces moved faster than expected, however, while Stuart’s cavalry moved slower than expected, leaving the Army of Northern Virginia unprotected and, more consequentially, blind as to the location of the main body of Federal troops.

By June 30, Lee’s army was spread across 60 miles in the Chambersburg and Carlisle area foraging for food. At this point, a scout under Confederate General James Longstreet reported that seven Federal corps of the Army of the Potomac were advancing north at a rapid pace. Longstreet persuaded Lee to issue an emergency concentration order to all Confederate troops to gather at Gettysburg, as it was the central hub for roads in the area. As the Confederate troops converged toward Gettysburg, Union cavalry officer John Buford had already arrived with two brigades of cavalry in the town of Gettysburg. When Confederate General J. Johnson Pettigrew and his brigade encountered Buford’s troops as they neared the town, he hastily retreated in an effort to adhere to Lee’s orders not to provoke a “general engagement” until the army was concentrated. Harry Heth, division commander, disbelieved Pettigrew’s reports and assumed that the forces he encountered must have been local militia. Corps commander A. P. Hill then ordered Heth to advance on Gettysburg the next morning to disperse the so-called militia forces.

Heth’s forces began their advance early on July 1. Even as they encountered stiffer-than-expected resistance from Buford’s cavalry forces, they failed to realize that these troops were part of the main Federal army. The Union cavalry made a gradual retreat toward the town of Gettysburg until infantry reinforcements from General John Reynolds’ First Corps arrived and began to stage a strong resistance. It was at this point that the Army of Northern Virginia finally realized that it was facing not local Federal militia but the Army of the Potomac, tipped off in part by the distinctive headgear of the First Corps’ Iron Brigade. After Confederate General James J. Archer was captured and 300 Confederate troops surrendered in the railroad cut, Lee ordered Heth to retreat. At this point in the tour, Dixon led us in a discussion of how leaders of organizations can guard against the type of cognitive bias that
led the Confederate generals to discount evidence that they were facing the Army of the Potomac.

As we transitioned toward the next stop of the tour on Oak Hill, Dixon recounted the deliberations that occurred at midday on July 1st among the leadership of the armies of both sides. On the Union side, General George Gordon Meade, who had been appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac only three days earlier, had initially favored pulling back and luring the Confederate army onto the Federal spear in Taneytown. But Reynolds, seeing the great ground that the Union possessed near Gettysburg, advocated taking a stand there. After Reynolds was killed in the morning’s fighting, Meade decided to send his trusted agent, General Winfield Scott Hancock of the Second Corps, to evaluate Reynold’s suggestion. By the end of the day, Hancock had confirmed Reynold’s assessment, and Meade moved the main body of Union troops forward by early on July 2nd.

Dixon contrasted the trust and clear communication on the Union side with the problematic management styles and miscommunications that afflicted the Confederate leadership during the battle. Lee, the consummate “macromanager,” exercised general “mission command” and empowered his subordinates with considerable operational leeway. Although this had often proven a strength for the Army of Northern Virginia, at Gettysburg it proved disastrous, as Lee’s subordinates coordinated their actions poorly and failed to implement orders fully. General Dick Ewell—recently promoted to corps commander after the death of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville—opted to attack Federal forces north of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1. With the help of left and right flank attacks from Confederate forces led by Early, Heath, and Pender, this move succeeded in pushing the Union troops to a hill on the far side of Gettysburg by the end of July 1st. However, Ewell did not act on Lee’s order to pursue the Union troops and occupy the hill south of Gettysburg “if at all practicable,” accustomed as he was to detailed and unambiguous orders from the micromanaging Stonewall Jackson. With this example in mind, Dixon emphasized the need for leaders to mentor their subordinates and be attentive to possible miscommunications.

The afternoon portion of the tour began at Peach Orchard, the site of heavy fighting on the second day of the battle, where General Lee launched an offensive attack against Union forces commanded by General Meade on a portion of the Union line under General Dan Sickles.

Dixon, emphasizing problems in the personal relationship between Sickles and General Meade, showed how their failure to communicate effectively led to a costly tactical error and heavy losses for the Army of the Potomac. Dixon told the story of how Sickles—a politically-appointed general, sitting Congressman, notorious womanizer, and murderer—disobeyed General Meade’s orders to occupy Little Round Top, choosing instead to station
his troops on the elevated ground at Peach Orchard. In doing so, Sickles over-extended the Union’s line, inviting Lee to launch an en echelon attack. Dixon explained the logic behind such an attack, which involves targeting an enemy’s formation in such a way that the enemy breaks rank in order to reinforce its line, creating an opening that can be exploited.

Dixon then took the group to Little Round Top, the most frequently visited battlefield site at Gettysburg. According to Dixon, Little Round Top looms large in Gettysburg history due to the powerful narrative put forth by its defender, rhetoric professor and Union Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. Chamberlain and his regiment, the 20th Maine, received orders to defend this rocky, wooded hillside at all costs against Confederate troops under the command of Colonel William Oates. After running out of ammunition, and in a desperate attempt to keep the Confederates from reaching the hill’s pinnacle, Chamberlain ordered his men to “fix bayonets” and engage the enemy in close combat. Dixon, however, questioned the accuracy of subsequent accounts of the regiment’s heroic defense of the hillside, and suggested that the use of bayonets may have been more spontaneous than strategic.

The next two stops for the afternoon were the Wheatfield and Cemetery Ridge, both of which are sites at which leaders and rank-and-file soldiers alike knowingly marched into the line of fire. The Wheatfield was the site of fierce back-and-forth fighting that resulted in devastating casualties for both sides. Included among these casualties were several brigadier generals and colonels, including Confederate Colonel Edward Cross and Union Colonel Harrison Jeffords. At Cemetery Ridge, Union General Winfield Hancock, facing a Confederate assault, ordered Colonel William Colvill’s 1st Minnesota regiment to charge at eight brigades led by General Cadmus Wilcox. According to Dixon, Colvill and his men, without hesitating, charged with bayonets out into the advancing Confederate line, despite knowing that they were essentially being ordered to their death. Their act of unexpected bravery not only bought Hancock the time he needed to gather reinforcements, but also stunned and turned back Wilcox’s brigades.

Next, Dixon led us to Seminary Ridge, the site of Pickett’s Charge. On the third and final day of the battle, General Lee remained committed to the strategic objective of breaking North’s will, even in light of the Confederates’ heavy losses the day before. In a last ditch effort to win the battle, Lee put in motion a four-part plan that included cavalry attacks on enemy logistics, a diversionary attack, an artillery bombardment, and an infantry assault. All of these parts failed, including the infantry assault led by General Longstreet, which became known as Pickett’s Charge. Dixon highlighted the reluctance of Longstreet, Lee’s most senior lieutenant, to order an attack that he did not believe could succeed. Major General George Pickett, despite Longstreet’s hesitation, led his men toward the ridge, defended by Union cannon crews and infantry. Dixon spoke to us at a position along the ridge known as “the Angle,” where there stands a stone marker honoring Union First Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing, who continued to lead his battery in repelling Confederate troops even after being
mortal wounded. It was along Seminary Ridge that Cushing and his fellow Federal troops defended the Union in the last battle at Gettysburg, forcing the Confederates to begin their retreat.

The tour ended at the Soldier’s Cemetery, the location of President Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg address in November 1863. Interestingly, President Lincoln was not the keynote speaker at the event and in fact, his short speech followed a two hour speech delivered by Edward Everett, a famous orator at the time. According to Dixon, Lincoln’s speech marked the beginning of his campaign for reelection, which was necessary for the preservation of the Union.

**Where we spoke**

**Fiona S. Cunningham:**
“Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” (co-authored with M. Taylor Fravel) at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco, and at a public event on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Toward China, hosted by the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, September, 2015.

Panelist for the China-U.S. Young Scholars Dialogue, hosted by the China Institute of International Studies, Quindao, China, October 2015.

**Mayumi Fukushima:**

**Frank Gavin:**


“Public History and Policy Relevance,” at the IAEA Oral History Project Expert Workshop, Organized by the IAEA History Research Project at the University of Vienna, in cooperation with the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC, November 19th, 2015.


Eugene Gholz:


“The Iran Nuclear Deal: Danger or Opportunity?” Public Debate against Alan Kuperman sponsored by the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy, Williams College, October 29, 2015.


Peter Krause:


“How to get State to Talk to you: Why Violent Territorial Conquest is an Organization’s Best Hope,” with Victor Asal and Daniel Gustafson, ISSS-ISAC Joint ISA and APSA Conference, October 2015.
Alan Kuperman:


Jon Lindsay:
Briefed members of the Canadian Department of National Defence on “China and Cybersecurity” and “Cross Domain Deterrence,” December 2, 2015.
Briefed the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Paul J. Selva, and JCS J5 staff members on “Cross Domain Deterrence,” December 4, 2015.

Joshua Rovner:


Richard Samuels:


Carol R. Saivetz:
“The Complexities of Domestic Politics in Central Asia,” American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee field trip to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, October 2015.

**Taylor Seybolt:**

**Apichai Shipper:**
Paper Presenter, “Immigrants’ Rights Activism and Xenophobic Activism in Japan,” Conference on Activism in Contemporary Japan, University of Zurich, Switzerland, November 2015.

**Alec Worsnop:**

**What we wrote**


http://cybersecurity.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/53

https://lawfareblog.com/russia-bets-assad

http://www.pacificaffairs.ubc.ca/forthcoming-issue/volume-89-no-1-review-essay/

Apichai Shipper, “For Love of Languages, Travel, and Fieldwork: A Tribute to Benedict Anderson,” Asia Pacific Memo (December 2015) 

Notes from all over

Mark Bell accepted the position of Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.


Randy Jayne has been elected as new Chairman of the Board of Directors for the US Air Force Academy Endowment. The Endowment (see: http://www.usafa.org/Endowment) is the fundraising and philanthropic organization for the Air Force Academy.

In September 2015, Greg Koblentz because the Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University.
Awards and Scholarships

Boaz Atzili and Anne Kantel jointly won the A. Leory Benet Award for a paper presented at ISA Northeast, “Accepting the Unacceptable: West Germany’s Shifting Territorial Concepts.”

Mark Bell was joint winner with Amanda Rothschild of the International Studies Association’s Patricia Weitsman award for best graduate student paper in security studies. Their paper is titled “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” and is published in the Summer 2015 issue of International Security.

Fiona S. Cunnginham was awarded a Joint PhD Research Fellowship by the China Confucius Studies Program to spend the 2015-16 academic year researching at the Renmin University of China, Beijing.

In October, 2015, Reid Pauly won the “Doreen & Jim McElvany Nonproliferation Challenge,” run by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. His paper will be published in The Nonproliferation Review. The award came with a cash prize.